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INTRODUCTION 
 Growth theory has been typically concerned with the 
process of physical and human capital accumulation. More 
recently, much attention has been devoted to the role played 
for growth by social capital, i.e. by those accumulated 
productive resources that are incorporated in the social 
structure of a society (rather than in physical goods or in 
single individuals). By its own nature, the process of 
accumulation of social capital is quite different from that of 
other forms of capital, because a large part of its payoffs is 
not privately appropriable. Thus, individuals may not have 
an adequate incentive to accumulate it. 
 We investigate the dynamics of social capital accum-
ulation within a neoclassical framework and show that 
under-investment in social capital may lead an economy to a 
social poverty trap. We take the view that social capital is 
crucial to the enjoyment of socially provided goods and that 
it is mainly accumulated by means of participation to social 
activities. Such participation, and the goods it provides, may 
be substituted for by some private activities, which generate 
private goods. Since most private goods enter in the GNP, 
whereas many socially provided goods don’t, this 
substitution process may foster growth exactly as the flip 
side of a process of social impoverishment. The choice of 
how to allocate time between social and private activities has 
two external effects: a direct one, on the ‘productivity’ of 
other people’s social activities at a given point in  time, and a  
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cumulative  one, on  social capital accumulation over time. If 
individuals are not able to internalize these externalities, the 
overall outcome of their choices may be sub-optimal, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are generating economic 
growth. 
 We interpret the possibility that growth and social 
impoverishment move together as relevant in the medium 
run, i.e. in a time horizon in which the choice of time 
allocation may change significantly, but which still is shorter 
than the very long run, since in the latter social impoverish-
ment renders growth unsustainable. We consider a society 
with homogeneous population, which empirically turns out 
to be the most favorable environment for social capital 
accumulation. Moreover, we disregard any contribution of 
social capital to the production of private goods, although 
such contributions are empirically relevant. As a 
consequence, the risk of falling into a social poverty trap that 
we find in our model would hold a  fortiori  if one takes into 
account a segmented population and the relationship between 
social capital and private production. The process we are 
investigating is particularly relevant for affluent societies, 
where pressure on time and other factors may indeed lead to 
a substitution of time-saving private activities for time-
intensive social ones. In a companion paper [Antoci, Sacco 
and Vanin (2007)], we study the same process within the 
context of an evolutionary model. Both the neoclassical and 
the evolutionary approach lead to analogous conclusions. In 
another companion paper [Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2005)], 
we show that the basic results we find here also extend to a 
more complex set-up, with both private and social capital 
accumulation. Therefore, while in the present context we 
model growth just in terms of an expansion in private 
production, explicit consideration of a private accumulable 
asset would not change the picture. The advantage of 
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focusing on social capital alone is that in the present paper 
we are able to characterize the dynamic analysis for any 
possible parameter configuration. 
 In Section 2 we consider the literature on social capital 
and growth and relate our work to it. Section 3 investigates 
the link between growth and social impoverishment. Section 
4 displays the model and its results. Section 5 concludes. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND GROWTH 
 In the last two decades economists have been paying a lot 
of attention to the role of social capital for growth. The term 
‘social capital’ was rendered popular by Coleman and 
Putnam and the World Bank (2008) has an entire electronic 
library on the topic. Coleman (1988, 1990) mentions as 
examples of social capital the level of trust and the 
information potential incorporated in relations, the existence 
of civic norms with effective sanctions, and the presence of 
hierarchical and horizontal relations and organizations. 
Putnam (1993) makes the point that a richer network of civic 
engagement and of horizontal organizations (this way he 
defines social capital) explains much of the economic 
advantage of Northern Italy over Southern Italy. Putnam 
(1995 and 2000) argues that social capital has been declining 
in the U.S. in the last thirty years, mainly due to the impact 
of television and to the aging of a generation with a strong 
civic commitment
1
. Different authors emphasize different 
aspects of social capital and the literature may be divided 
into two main branches, according to whether social capital 
is defined at the individual level or at the group level
2
. 
 To the first branch, pioneered by Coleman, belong, for 
instance, Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) and 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), who investigate individual 
social capital and focus on individual investment in social 
skills and in connections to others, respectively. Both social 
skills and social connections yield a private return: for 
instance, Becker (1981) offers a classical example of the 
returns to social skills in the marriage market and 
Granovetter (1973) shows the relevance of ‘weak’ 
connections to find a job. 
 Group level definitions of social capital focus on the 
economic impact either of trust and civic norms or of 
voluntary associations and horizontal organizations
3
. Paldam 
and Svendsen (2000) summarize a line of thought that goes 
from Arrow (1971) to Fukuyama (1995) and emphasize that 
the density of trust in a group or in a society influences 
                                                
1 Costa and Kahn (2003) show that the decline in the social capital produced 
outside home is mainly due to rising community heterogeneity (especially 
income inequality), whereas the decline of the social capital produced at 
home is mainly explained by women’s increased labor force participation 
rate. 
2 At the highest level of generality, Narayan (1999) defines social capital as 
‘the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of societies 
that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals’. 
3 Collier (1998) distinguishes among social capital created in different 
groups, i.e., at different institutional levels: family, firm, government and 
civil society. Narayan (1999) points out that the relation between govern-
mental services and social capital is not univocally of substitution or of 
complementarity. Bowles and Gintis (2002) make similar considerations, 
but they criticize the term ‘social capital’. 
economic outcomes because it determines how easily people 
work together. 
 The empirical relevance of social capital for growth has 
been highlighted, among others, by Knack and Keefer 
(1997), Temple and Johnson (1998), Zak and Knack (2001) 
and Knack (2003). The broad message of this literature is 
that generalized trust has a strong and robust positive impact 
on growth
4
. On the other side, although social participation 
fosters trust, its growth impact does not appear to be 
relevant. In other words, most effects of social participation 
remain confined to the social sphere
5
, whereas trust directly 
affects growth. 
 Different forms of social capital may have different 
effects. Social capital tends to exert positive aggregate 
effects when trust, norms and networks that foster 
cooperation extend beyond primary, ethnic, linguistic or even 
income groups and form ‘bridges’ among different groups. 
This last point is made with particular strength by Narayan 
(1999), who observes that the same links that keep together 
the members of a group may also exclude the non-members, 
and who displays an analytical framework to study ‘bonding’ 
(intra-group) and ‘bridging’ (inter-group) links. On a similar 
line, Annen (2001) adapts Spagnolo’s (1999) model to study 
the different impact of ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ social 
capital (defined in terms of entry costs into social networks). 
He argues that inclusive social capital can combine high 
gains from trade with low enforcement costs, thereby raising 
economic performance, whereas exclusive social capital may 
impede growth by limiting gains from trade and diffusion of 
new ideas, as well as by generating rent-seeking. The 
different impact of different social networks on private 
activities with positive external effects is also emphasized by 
Nepal, Bohara and Berrens (2007). Yet they focus on private 
contributions to environmental capital, whereas our focus is 
on social capital accumulation. 
 A number of contributions tackle the issue of how social 
capital, in its various forms, is accumulated. Glaeser, 
Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) show theoretically and 
empirically that individuals invest in social skills in the same 
way as they do in human capital
6
. DiPasquale and Glaeser 
(1999) display a model predicting that homeowners invest 
more than renters both in social connections and in local 
amenities. The data confirm this prediction and show that the 
main reason is that homeownership decreases mobility. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), Zak and Knack (2001), 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman 
and Soutter (2000) all find empirically that social 
heterogeneity and social distance, in terms of income, ‘race’ 
                                                
4 The empirical problem of measuring trust has been deeply addressed by 
Glaeser et al. (2000), who find that standard survey questions about trust 
provide a better measure of trustworthiness than of trusting behavior. How-
ever, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) present experimental evidence that 
higher trust increases trustworthiness. Indeed, these two aspects are highly 
correlated. 
5 Just to give two examples, Leung (2002) finds that several forms of social 
participation reduce the probability of becoming a delinquent and 
Buonanno, Montolio and Vanin (2008) find that social capital reduces prop-
erty crimes. 
6 Since they call ‘social capital’ the social component of human capital, their 
result is not surprising. 
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and ethnic origin, reduce trust. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) 
focus on the effect of heterogeneity on participation in 
associational activities like religious groups, sport groups, 
hobby clubs, unions, and so on. Using data for metropolitan 
areas in the U.S. from 1974 to 1994 and controlling for 
individual and community characteristics, they show that 
social participation is higher where income inequality, 
‘racial’ segmentation and ethnic segmentation are lower
7
. 
 Summing up, heterogeneity has a negative effect on both 
social participation and trust, but while trust has a positive 
effect on economic outcomes, participation has mainly social 
effects. We restrict our attention to a homogeneous society 
and to the time allocation choice between private and social 
activities. We argue that aggregate social participation today 
increases the ‘productivity’ of the time spent in social 
activities both today and tomorrow, since it contributes to the 
formation of a ‘better’, socially more rewarding 
environment. In other words, it contributes to social capital 
accumulation. Investment in social capital takes here the 
primary form of time investment in social activities and its 
costs can be measured in terms of forgone private 
consumption. 
 As mentioned above, Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote 
(2002) display a neoclassical model of investment in social 
capital. The main difference between their model and ours 
arises from the fact that what they call ‘social capital’ is the 
social component of individual human capital, whereas we 
look at social capital from an aggregate point of view. In our 
framework, individuals forgo private consumption and 
undertake social activities primarily because they seek 
socially provided goods. Social capital accumulation 
emerges as a by-product, as an external effect
8
. Such aspects 
make the process of social capital accumulation quite 
different from physical and human capital accumulation. We 
emphasize this point and show how it translates into an 
otherwise standard neoclassical model. 
 Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) present a model 
which is very close in spirit to ours to study the effects of 
technological change on labor mobility and, as a by-product, 
on social capital, but they do not present an explicit dynamic 
model of social capital accumulation, which is precisely one 
of the main contributions of our paper. 
GROWTH AND SOCIAL IMPOVERISHMENT 
 We start with the consideration that individuals have 
material and relational needs. Most of the first ones may be 
                                                
7 This happens in the North/Northwest of the U.S., the opposite features 
appearing in the South/Southeast. Moreover, looking at participation in 
different kinds of groups, they find that heterogeneity matters less for par-
ticipation in groups with a relatively high degree of excludability or a low 
degree of close interaction among members. Finally, they find that ‘racial’ 
segmentation matters more for individuals more averse to ‘racial’ mixing. 
8 Indeed, it is a common feature of non-material forms of capital that in-
vestment and consumption come close to one another: think e.g. of knowl-
edge. In the case of social capital something similar happens: to some extent 
individuals participate to social activities with an intentional purpose to 
invest in relations, but to some extent participation is more a consumption 
than an investment activity, where the goods consumed are ‘relational’ 
rather than private. 
satisfied by private consumption activities, whereas the 
second ones are mostly satisfied by socially provided goods. 
These goods are referred to by Uhlaner (1989) as ‘relational 
goods’; other authors, e.g. Corneo and Jeanne (1999), prefer 
to speak of socially provided private goods
9
. We make use of 
either terminology. Examples of relational goods include 
friendship and enjoyment of shared leisure
10
. Two peculiar 
aspects of relational goods are that they cannot be enjoyed 
alone and that it is mostly very difficult to separate their 
‘production’ form their ‘consumption’, since they easily 
coincide. Indeed, not only ‘consumers’ and ‘producers’ are 
the same agents, but social participation ‘produces’ relational 
goods at the same time that it lets participants ‘consume’ 
them, i.e. enjoy them: relational goods are a special case of 
Cornes and Sandler’s (1984) joint production model. 
 Relational goods are scarce goods because their 
enjoyment is subject to a time budget constraint (possibly 
also to a monetary budget constraint, but we focus on the 
first one). They are brought about by participation to social 
activities, which are time-intensive. At least since Becker’s 
(1965) pioneering contribution, we know that time is a scarce 
resource and that an increased pressure on it (an increase in 
the value of time) leads to a substitution of time-saving 
activities for time-intensive ones
11
. Growth itself brings 
about an increase in the opportunity cost of time, which is 
clearly more expensive today in advanced societies than it 
used to be in the past
12
. An early account of this process is 
provided by Hirsch (1976): 
 As the subjective cost of time rises, pressure for specific 
balancing of personal advantage in social relationships will 
increase. Perception of the time spent in social relationships 
as a cost is itself a product of privatized affluence. The effect 
is to whittle down the amount of friendship and social 
contact. The huge increase in personal mobility in modern 
economies adds to the problem by making sociability more 
of a public and less of a private good. The more people 
move, the lower are the chances of social contacts being 
reciprocated directly on a bilateral basis (Hirsch 1976, p. 80). 
 The relevance of the last point, i.e., of personal mobility, 
for the substitution of private for social activities, is also 
investigated by Schiff (1992 and 1999) and by the above 
mentioned contributions by Routledge and von Amsberg 
(2003) and by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999). When this 
substitution takes place, we may observe at the same time 
social impoverishment and private growth, as, according to 
Putnam (2000), we have indeed observed in the U.S. in the 
last three decades of the XX century. The overall effect in 
terms of well-being may be either negative (so that we can 
                                                
9 They argue that the desire of such goods may lead individuals to invest 
more in their own human capital and may thus have a positive impact on 
growth. 
10 Survey data on time uses, on the frequency of friends meeting and on 
participation to various associations, easily available in several countries, 
may be used to construct empirical proxies of relational goods. 
11 Fast-foods are successful because they are fast, not because they offer 
good food! 
12 It may be argued that socially provided goods become scarce in affluent 
societies, when growth, increasing the value of time, renders the time budget 
constraint binding. 
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speak of social poverty traps), because efficiency gains may 
be outweighted by the loss in social capital, or positive, when 
the reverse happens
13
. 
 For the sake of concreteness, in the model we identify 
private activities with the time spent working or consuming 
and social activities with the time spent in social 
participation outside the job. Of course, we are aware of the 
socializing value of working, as well as of the fact that 
working is almost never a truly private activity, since it 
requires cooperation with other people, but, as shown 
empirically by Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), among 
employed people there is a negative relation between the 
time spent in social participation and in private production. 
Moreover, our interpretation corresponds to the standard 
view that labor time is a bad and not a good and, since in our 
model there is no unemployment, we feel that this is a good 
first approximation. 
THE MODEL 
Preferences and Technology 
 We consider an economy constituted by a continuous 
population of identical individuals (indicated as  [0,1] ), 
who ‘every day’ (we model ‘days’ in continuous time, 
indicate them with t  and normalize their length to 1) choose 
how to allocate their time between private and social 
activities. In day t , the fraction of time spent by individual 
  in social activities, s (t) , provides him or her utility in the 
form of a socially provided good B (t) , whose amount 
depends, besides on s (t) , on average social participation, 
s (t) =
0
1 s (t)d , and on the ‘quality’ of the social 
environment inherited from the past, i.e., on social capital 
Ks (t) . We assume that there is a private good Cs (t)  which 
is a perfect substitute of the relational good B (t)  and we 
denote ls (t)  the fraction of time spent by   to produce and 
consume Cs (t) . Finally, individuals satisfy their subsistence 
needs by devoting time l (t)  to produce and consume a 
subsistence good C (t) . We think of the activities of 
production and consumption of Cs (t)  and of C (t)  as of 
private activities. We assume that Cs (t)  and C (t)  are not 
accumulable and let the instantaneous individual utility 
function be: 
u (t) = ln[C (t)]+ b ln[B (t) + aCs (t)],          (1) 
where a > 0  is the marginal rate of substitution between 
B (t)  and Cs (t) , and b > 0  captures the relative weight 
attributed to non-subsistence vs subsistence needs. 
                                                
13 We acknowledge that mobility might improve sorting and the potential 
quality of social matches, but we emphasize that it may reduce the time 
available to build relationship-specific social capital and it may substantially 
fasten its depreciation. This corresponds to the common experience of mi-
grants and of scholars studying or working abroad. 
 We assume linear technologies in the production of 
private goods and a Cobb-Douglas technology in the 
production of the relational good: 
C (t) =l (t),  > 0,            (2) 
Cs (t) = ls (t),  > 0,            (3) 
B (t) =  s (t) s (t) Ks (t) ,  ,   ,   ,   > 0.         (4) 
 Social capital in this economy is accumulated as 
individuals spend time in social activities and generate 
durable relations, which become the basis for the 
development of trust, civic norms and voluntary associations. 
It seems therefore natural to model aggregate ‘investment’ in 
social capital Is (t)  as an increasing function of the quantity 
of relational goods produced (and consumed) at a certain 
time in the economy, according to a sort of learning-by-
doing mechanism. Perhaps the easiest way to model such 
‘investment’ is the following: 
Is (t) = 0
1 B (t)d .             (5) 
 Notice that we use the term ‘investment’ in analogy with 
what drives the accumulation of other forms of capital. 
Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that here individuals do not 
‘invest’ time in social activities with the purpose of 
accumulating social capital, but rather to enjoy the relational 
goods they get through participation to social activities. 
Indeed, they consider social capital as a public good and they 
do not internalize the effects of their choices on its 
accumulation. Such accumulation appears therefore just as a 
byproduct of activities with different aims. This is indeed 
one of the first intuitions about social capital, already pointed 
out by Coleman. 
 Since relations deteriorate if they are not taken care of, 
the full dynamics of social capital has to incorporate a 
depreciation rate   0 : 
 
Ks (t) = Is (t) Ks (t).            (6) 
Individual Maximization Problem 
 Let r  be the rate at which individual   discounts future 
utility. The individual’s maximization problem in our 
economy is then: 
s , l , ls
max
0
 u (t)ert dt, s.t.           (7) 
s (t),  l (t), ls (t)  0,  
s (t) + ls (t) + l (t) = 1,  
 
Ks (t) = Is (t) Ks (t).  
 The associated Hamiltonian function is: 
H[s (t),l (t),ls (t),Ks (t),] = u (t) + [Is (t) Ks (t)].  
 Since the population is continuous, the choice of s (t)  by 
a single individual has no impact on Is (t) , so that each 
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individual considers Is (t)  as exogenous (notice that the 
same is true for s (t) ). Hence,  , the shadow-price of Ks , 
does not appear in the conditions for the maximization of the 
Hamiltonian function with respect to the control variables. 
As a consequence, these conditions coincide with those 
obtained for the maximization of u (t)  in each instant of 
time with respect to the same control variables. We therefore 
omit the time index and, since individuals are identical, also 
the index  , and solve the representative individual’s point-
wise problem: 
s,  l ,  ls
max u = ln(l) + b ln( s s Ks + als ) s.t.          (8) 
s, l, ls  0, s + l + ls = 1.           (9) 
 Remark 1 Since constraints (9) determine a compact set 
and the objective function u  is continuous, for any level of 
sK  problem (8) - (9) has a solution. 
 The Lagrangean function is: 
L(s,  l,  ls ,   ) = ln(l) + b ln( s s Ks + als ) (s + l + ls 1)  
and the solution must satisfy the following first order 
conditions (where we exploit the fact that ex post s = s ): 
L
l =
1
l
  0;        Ll  l = 0, l  0;        (10) 

L

s =
b s +1Ks
 s +Ks + als   0;

L

s  s = 0, s 	 0;      (11) 

L

ls =
ab
 s +Ks + als   0;

L

ls  ls = 0, ls 	 0;
     (12) 
s + l + ls = 1.           (13) 
 From the expression of u  in problem (8) it is immediate 
to conclude that the representative agent allocates his or her 
time in such a way that [l > 0  (s > 0  ls > 0)]  always 
holds (so that we have 0 < l < 1 ). Now, condition (10) 
implies 1
l
= . A straightforward substitution in the first order 
conditions then shows that a necessary condition to have 
both s > 0  and ls > 0  is: 
 s +1Ks   = 0.          (10) 
 It is easy to show that condition (14) may define the 
representative agent’s optimal choice only if  +  < 1 , 
whereas for  +   1  the representative agent chooses either 
s  or ls  equal to zero
14
. We can thus separate these two 
cases. 
 Case (a):  +   1  
                                                
14 If  +  > 1 , condition (14) determines a local minimum instead of a local 
maximum, whereas, if  +  = 1 , Ls  is independent of s  and again we 
have either s = 0  or ls = 0 . 
 If the representative agent chooses s = 0, ls =1 l , it 
must hold that 
L
ls =
b
1 l 
1
l
= 0 , so that: 
l =
1
1+ b
, ls =
b
1+ b
.          (11) 
 If the choice is instead such that ls = 0, s =1 l , it must 
hold that 
L
s =
b
1 l 
1
l
= 0 , so that: 
l =
1
1+ b , s =
b
1+ b .         (12) 
 Straightforward substitution of these values in the utility 
function yields that choice (16) is strictly better than choice 
(15), if and only if: 
Ks > Kˆs  ab(1+ b )
 ++1
b
 (b ) + (1+ b)1+
1
b

	





1

.           (13) 
 For Ks < Kˆs  the representative agent chooses s = 0  and 
ls > 0 , whereas for Ks > Kˆs  he or she chooses s > 0  and 
ls = 0
15
. 
 Case (b):  +  < 1  
 When  +  < 1 , s0lim Bs =  , so that the 
representative individual always chooses s > 0 , whatever the 
value of Ks . Equation (14) then implies that for Ks  
sufficiently high ls = 0  is chosen, for Ks  sufficiently low 
instead ls > 0 . The critical threshold  
Ks  may be determined 
by plugging ls = 0  and 
1
l
=  into equations (11) and (12) 
and by equalizing 
L
s =
L
ls = 0 , so to obtain the value of 
Ks  for which ls = 0  and s =1 l , but the non-negativity 
constraint on s  is not yet binding. This yields: 
L
s =
b s +1Ks
 s +Ks 
1
l
=
b
s
 1
1 s = 0,        (18) 
L
ls =
ab
 s +Ks 
1
l
=
ab
 s +Ks 
1
1 s = 0.       (19) 
 Equation (18) implies s =
b
1+ b , which, substituted in 
equation (19), yields: 
                                                
15 For Ks = Kˆs  the representative agent is indifferent between the two 
choices; whatever the choice, in Ks = Kˆs  dynamics (22) below is discon-
tinuous from right. Notice that one could speculate on the effect of the pa-
rameters on Kˆs , but at the present stage they do not constitute our main 
focus. The same will be valid with 
 
Ks  below. 
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Ks = Ks  ab (b ) + (1+ b )1 


	


1

.        (14) 
 For 
 
Ks < Ks  the choice of s  and ls  is determined by 
equation (14) as: 
s =

a Ks

	



1
1 
.          (15) 
 For 
 
Ks  Ks  it is determined by equation (16). 
Social Participation, Growth and Social Poverty Traps 
 Taking into account the representative individual’s equili-
brium choices, dynamics (6) becomes: 
 
Ks (t) =  s(Ks ) + Ks  Ks .         (16) 
where s(Ks )  is the following function
16
: 
Case (a):   +   1 : s(Ks ) =
0 Ks < Kˆs
b
1+ b Ks  Kˆs



      (23) 
Case (b):   +  < 1 :
 
s(Ks ) =

a Ks


	


1
1 
Ks < Ks
b
1+ b Ks  Ks





      (24) 
 Remark 2 Ks = 0  is always a fixed point of dynamics 
(22) and in such state the representative agent chooses s = 0. 
 This means that both social capital and social parti-
cipation are null, whereas production and consumption of 
private goods reach their maximum. If relational goods 
played no role in determining well-being, this would be the 
best possible outcome, but if we introduce relational con-
cerns in the utility function, such a result may be completely 
reversed, as the next remark makes clear. 
 Remark 3 The fixed point with Ks = 0  is Pareto-
dominated by any other point in which Ks > 0  and the 
representative agent chooses s > 0. Moreover, if Ks
*
 and Ks
**
 
are two fixed points such that Ks
** > Ks
*
, then Ks
*
 is Pareto-
dominated by Ks
**
. 
 The first part of Remark 3 follows from a straightforward 
substitution in the utility function. The intuition behind the 
second statement is as well straightforward, since an increase 
in the level of Ks  amounts to an expansion of the production 
and consumption possibility set. In fact, any choice of 
                                                
16 Notice that in equation (23), when Ks = Kˆs , the representative individual 
is indifferent between s = 0  and s =
b
1+ b , but the specific value of s  
chosen in a single point is not relevant for dynamics (22); in equation (24) 
this problem does not even arise, since it defines in that case s(Ks )  is a 
continuous function. 
s,  l,  ls  that is possible under Ks
*
 is still possible under Ks
** ; 
moreover, it provides at least the same utility and, if s > 0 , a 
strictly higher utility. We can therefore introduce the 
following definition. 
 Definition 4 Let Ks
*
 be the highest value of Ks  in a 
locally attracting fixed point of dynamics (22). We call 
‘social poverty trap’ any other fixed point such that 
Ks < Ks
*
, if existing. 
 It is perhaps useful to stress again at this point that we are 
ignoring the possible double link between social capital and 
‘private’ production activities: empirical research shows that 
social capital increases private production and growth; on the 
other hand, the-job interaction might generate social capital, 
in the same way as social interaction. The first link, if 
considered, would reinforce our definition of social poverty 
traps, whereas the second one would make it less compelling. 
Recall from our discussion in the previous section that, if we 
neglect unemployment, a negative relation emerges between 
working time and social participation, so that the first link 
seems to prevail. An additional argument may come from the 
observation that voluntary social participation usually 
involves a higher degree of internal pro-social motivation 
than working activities, which plays a key role in the 
development of trust. The empirical and the motivational 
arguments, taken together, make us confident that the 
omitted link is more likely to reinforce our definition of 
social poverty traps than to weaken it. 
Dynamics of Social Capital Accumulation 
 In the Appendix we classify dynamics (22) under (23) – 
(24), taking into account all the possible combinations of 
parameter values. Here we focus on just one case of 
particular interest. 
 Assumption 5 Assume  +  < 1 ,  < 1 ,  +  +  > 1  
and let   be small17. 
 In this case, as shown in Fig. (14) of the Appendix, that 
we reproduce here for ease of reading, there exist two locally 
attracting fixed points, one with no social capital, which 
constitutes a social poverty trap, and a Pareto-superior one 
with positive social capital
18
. Their attraction basins are 
separated by a repulsive fixed point. If initial social capital is 
above this threshold, the economy converges to the fixed 
point with a positive stock of social capital. Now observe 
that along decreasing paths of Ks  private production and 
consumption increase, whereas social participation decreases. 
                                                
17  +  < 1  means that we are in case (b): intuitively, we can think of this 
assumption in terms of decreasing returns to scale of social participation, 
even though this is not literally correct, since social participation is a frac-
tion s [0,1] .  < 1  means that social capital has decreasing returns to 
scale in the production of B .  +  +  > 1  resembles the idea of aggregate 
increasing returns to scale in the production of B . A small   means that 
social capital does not depreciate too fast. 
18 In the figures we call f (Ks )  [s(Ks )] + Ks , where s(Ks )  is given by 
equations (23) and (24), so that 
 
Ks = f (Ks ) Ks . 
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Therefore, if convergence takes place from below, we have 
social development at the expenses of private activities; if it 
takes place from above, along the convergence path we 
observe an expansion of private activities. If initial social 
capital is below the threshold, the economy experiences an 
expansion of private activities along the convergence path, 
but converges to the Pareto-inferior fixed point, i.e., to the 
social poverty trap. The role of social capital depreciation 
rate is to move the threshold: the faster social capital 
depreciates, the larger the attraction basin of the social 
poverty trap. Indeed, if   is too high, the attractor with 
positive social capital disappears. 
 
The possibility of two attractors, one of which is a social poverty 
trap. 
Policy Speculations 
 Even though the present framework does not allow to 
formulate solid policy conclusions, it does allow to make 
some policy speculations. It seems plausible to think that the 
speed of social capital depreciation is strictly related to the 
degree in individual mobility of a society. From this point of 
view, our framework leads, through a different way, to the 
same point of Schiff’s (1992) analysis of the impact of labor 
mobility on social capital and welfare. Our result is also in 
accordance to Schiff’s (1999 and 2002) discussion of the 
difference between the two main forms of factor mobility: 
migration and trade. While the former one has relevant and 
often overlooked social consequences, the same is not true 
for the latter one. The bottom line of this discussion is not to 
argue against individual mobility, since its positive aspects 
have not been taken into account here. Rather, it is to stress 
that the evaluation of its well-being consequences should 
take into account its effects on social capital and enjoyment 
of relational goods. 
 As we have seen, besides the problem generated by a 
high social capital depreciation rate, there is the problem 
determined by the presence of externalities. If policy has any 
scope from this point of view, it should be to let individuals 
internalize the direct and the indirect externality of social 
participation, i.e. take into account the effect of their own 
participation on average social participation today, and 
thereby on the amount of socially provided goods they enjoy 
themselves today, and on social capital accumulation, and 
thereby on the amount of relational goods they will be able to 
enjoy tomorrow. Such aims can probably be achieved to 
some extent through educational policy. Notice that reward 
schemes of a Pigouvian kind could in principle solve the 
direct externality problem, since this would only require 
information about technology, but to solve the cumulative 
externality problem the public authority needs to know the 
individual intertemporal discount rate. Moreover, besides all 
the traditional problems associated to these policy 
instruments, a further problem is generated by the role of 
intrinsic motivations in determining social participation. As 
pointed out by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), incentives may 
have the effect of changing the way people frame a situation 
(for instance they can let individuals re-interpret a non-
market good in market terms), so that they can crowd out 
intrinsic (or social) motivations. Since voluntary social 
participation does not belong to the class of market activities, 
one should be careful in applying incentives schemes that 
have been designed to operate within the scope of the 
market. 
CONCLUSION 
 The basic argument driving the present model starts with 
the recognition that individual well-being depends on 
satisfaction of both material and relational needs. The first 
ones may be satisfied to a great extent through private 
activities, whereas the second ones may only be satisfied by 
participating to social activities. The outcome of private 
activities typically enters in the GDP, but much of the 
outcome of social activities, namely what we call relational 
goods, does not. Moreover, social participation generates a 
direct externality, in that it raises the ‘productivity’ of the 
time other individuals spend in social activities, and a 
cumulative externality, in that it contributes to the formation 
of social capital. Social capital positively increases the 
returns to both private and social activities, but we just 
concentrate on the latter effect, arguing that our basic results 
would still hold if we considered the former one as well. Our 
basic result can be stated as follows: even with a 
homogeneous population of optimizing agents, an economy 
may get stuck in a social poverty trap, i.e., in a Pareto-
dominated equilibrium, if its initial stock of social capital is 
too low or if the ‘depreciation’ rate of social capital is too 
high. Along the transition path towards a social poverty trap 
an economy may experience at the same time private growth, 
registered in national accounting, and social impoverishment. 
The reason why optimizing agents may fail to reach the 
optimum is straightforward: they are not able to internalize 
the direct and cumulative external effects of their actions. In 
particular, we focus on the possibility of substituting some 
kinds of private goods for relational goods. When individuals 
operate such substitution they do not calculate that some 
positive externalities go lost. We argue that this substitution 
process may be of empirical relevance especially for 
advanced economies: since social activities are typically 
Ks
Ks
*Ks
_
ηKs
f(Ks)
Ks
~
f(Ks)
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time-intensive, the increasing pressure on time experienced 
by advanced societies provides a strong incentive to 
substitute time-saving private activity for social participation. 
Moreover, the process may be self-feeding, because when an 
economy is experiencing at the same time private growth and 
a decline in social participation and social capital, the time 
spent in social activities becomes both more expensive (in 
terms of opportunity cost) and less ‘productive’ (in terms of 
relational goods). This framework allows policy speculations 
on the impact of labor mobility on well-being through its 
effect on social capital depreciation rate and on the 
possibility and the difficulty to provide adequate incentives 
to social participation. 
 In two companion papers [Antoci, Sacco and Vanin 
(2007 and 2005)] we investigate this process within the 
framework of an evolutionary growth model and introducing 
private capital accumulation besides social capital 
accumulation, respectively. Both extensions confirm the 
validity of the basic result that under-investment in social 
capital may lead a growing economy to fall into a social 
poverty trap. Empirical tests of the theory and theoretical 
study of a heterogeneous population are in our future 
research agenda. 
APPENDIX 
 Case (a):  +   1  
 In this case equations (22) and (23) imply: 
 
Ks =
Ks Ks < Kˆs
 b
1+ b


	


 +
Ks
  Ks Ks  Kˆs



       (17) 
 Notice first that if  = 0 , i.e. if we neglect the role of 
‘depreciation’ of social capital, we have that every value 
Ks [0, Kˆs )  is a fixed point, whereas starting from higher 
initial values of social capital Ks (0)  Kˆs  we have Ks  . 
The extension of the locus of social poverty traps is then 
determined by the parameters that affect Kˆs , identified in 
equation (17). 
 Let us now assume that social capital ‘depreciates’, i.e. 
0> 19. We can then distinguish the following subcases. 
 (a.1):  > 1 . With increasing marginal ‘productivity’ of 
Ks , we have the three cases illustrated in Figs. (2-4), there 
are always two attractors, Ks = 0  and Ks =  . For low 
values of   (Figs. 1,2) the respective attraction basins are 
separated by Kˆs  (in Fig. (2) Kˆs  is a repulsive fixed point, in 
Fig. (1) it is not a fixed point); for high values of   (Fig. 3) 
they are separated by a repulsive fixed point Ks > Kˆs , which 
                                                
19 The assumption of linear depreciation, proportional to the existing stock 
of Ks , is the easiest and most immediate one, but other forms of deprecia-
tion, possibly more realistic, could be conceived as well. 
means that a higher ‘depreciation rate’ expands the basin of 
attraction of social poverty. 
 
Fig. (1). 
 
Fig. (2). 
 
Fig. (3). 
Ks
ηKs
f(Ks)
f(Ks)
Ks
^
Ks
ηKs
f(Ks)
Ks
^
f(Ks)
Ks
ηKs
f(Ks)
Ks
^ Ks
_
f(Ks)
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 (a.2):  = 1 . With constant returns to scale of social 
capital in the ‘production’ of relational goods, low values of 
  (Fig. 4) are again associated with the presence of the 
attractors Ks = 0  and Ks =  , separated by Kˆs  (which is 
not a fixed point). The intermediate value  =  b
1+ b




	
 +
 
(Fig. 5) renders all Ks [Kˆs ,)  fixed points; [0, Kˆs )  is the 
attraction basin of the social poverty trap Ks = 0 . Finally, 
for higher values of   (Fig. 6), Ks = 0  becomes globally 
attracting. Notice that in this last case we do not speak any 
more of a social poverty trap, since there is no way the 
economy can avoid it, unless the primitives, i.e. preferences 
and technology, change. On the contrary, when social 
poverty traps are present, i.e. when there are two or more 
locally attracting fixed points, in which one of them the 
economy ends up depends crucially on its initial endowment 
of social capital: different previous histories, reflected in 
different initial endowments, explain why otherwise identical 
economies may end up with completely different social and 
cultural structures, in terms of allocation of time between the 
social and the private sphere. 
 
Fig. (4). 
 
Fig. (5). 
 
Fig. (6). 
 (a.3):  < 1 . With decreasing returns to scale to social 
capital, Ks =   is never an attractor. For low values of   
(Fig. 7) there are two locally attracting fixed points, Ks = 0  
and Ks > Kˆs , whose attraction basins are respectively 
[0, Kˆs )  and [Kˆs ,) ; as   increases, first Ks  converges to 
Kˆs , until it reaches this value (Fig. 8), then, for even higher 
values of   (Fig. 9), Ks = 0  becomes the only, globally 
attracting fixed point. 
 
Fig. (7). 
 
Fig. (8). 
Ks
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f(Ks)
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^
f(Ks)
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ηKs f(Ks)
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^
,
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ηKs
f(Ks)
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^
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Ks
ηKs
f(Ks)
Ks
^ Ks
_
f(Ks)
Ks
ηKs
f(Ks)
Ks
^
f(Ks)
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Fig. (9). 
 Case (b):  +  < 1  
 In this case equations (22) and (24) imply: 
 
Ks =
 
a
	




 +
1 
Ks
 1
1   Ks Ks < Ks
 b
1+ b
	




 +
Ks
  Ks Ks  Ks





      (18) 
 It is easy to show that equation (26) defines 
 
Ks  as a 
continuous function of Ks  (in particular, it is continuous at 
 
Ks , even if it is not derivable at this point). Let us now 
consider the exponent of Ks  for  Ks <
Ks ; since 
 1
1    >  , then if   1 , it holds 
1
1    > 1 ; if 
 < 1 , it holds  1
1     1 +  +   1 , i.e. when the 
function G(s, s ,Ks ) =  s s Ks  has either constant returns to 
scale (case  +  +  =1 ) or increasing returns to scale (case 
 +  +  > 1 ). In the following classification we consider all 
these cases and omit for simplicity those ones which are not 
‘robust’, meaning that a slight change in the parameters 
modifies qualitatively dynamics (26). 
 (b.1):  > 1 . There always exists a repulsive fixed point 
Ks  which separates the attraction basin of the social poverty 
trap Ks = 0  from the states of the economy starting from 
which Ks   (Fig. 10); Ks  may be greater, equal or less 
than 
 
Ks . An increase of the ‘depreciation’ rate   has the 
effect of expanding the attraction basin of Ks = 0 . 
 (b.2):  = 1 . In this case, for low values of   (Fig. 11) a 
repulsive fixed point 
 
Ks < Ks  separates the attraction basin 
of the social poverty trap Ks = 0  from that of Ks =  . As 
  increases, Ks  converges to sK~ ; when it reaches this 
value (Fig. 12), all 
 
Ks ( Ks ,)  are fixed points, whereas 
 
(0, Ks )  is the attraction basin of the social poverty trap 
Ks = 0 . For even higher values of   (Fig. 13), Ks = 0  
becomes the only, globally attracting fixed point. 
 
Fig. (10). 
 
Fig. (11). 
 
Fig. (12). 
Ks
ηKs
f(Ks)
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^
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_
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_
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~
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~
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ηKs f(Ks),
f(Ks)
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Fig. (13). 
 (b.3):  < 1 . We have now to distinguish among the 
following subcases. 
 (b.3.1):  +  +  > 1 . In this case, as in case (a.3), 
Ks =   is never an attractor. For low values of   (Fig. 14) 
there are two locally attracting fixed points, Ks = 0  and 
 
Ks
* > Ks , whose attraction basins are separated by a 
repulsive fixed point 
 
Ks < Ks  and are respectively [0,Ks )  
and (Ks ,) . As   increases, Ks  and Ks*  converge to each 
other, until the situation described in Fig. (15) is reached. For 
even higher values of   (Fig. 16), 0=sK  becomes the 
only globally attracting fixed point. 
 
Fig. (14). 
 (b.3.2):  +  +  = 1 . In this case, once again, Ks =   is 
never an attractor. For low   (Fig. 17), there exists a fixed 
point 
 
Ks > Ks  whose attraction basin is (0,) : any 
economy with a positive initial social capital ends up there; 
of course, Ks = 0  is still a fixed point, but it is now 
repulsive. As   grows, Ks  converges to  Ks  and when it 
reaches it (Fig. 18) we have a segment 
 
[0, Ks )  of fixed 
points which correspond to social poverty traps and the fixed 
point 
 
Ks  whose basin of attraction is  [ Ks ,) . Higher values 
of   (Fig. 19) render Ks = 0  globally attracting. 
 
Fig. (15). 
 
Fig. (16). 
 
Fig. (17). 
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Fig. (18). 
 
Fig. (19). 
 (b.3.3):  +  +  < 1 . In this last case (Fig. 20), there 
exists a point Ks > 0  which is an attractor for all Ks > 0 ; 
Ks = 0  is a repulsive fixed point. 
 
Fig. (20). 
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